ix "No plan of operations," he wrote, "survives the first collision with
the main body of the enemy." Therefore, he concluded, strategy - and in this context he included operations and even tactics
- was little more than a "system of expedients."
ix Moltke rarely issued more than a general outline of his plans. Army and major
formation commanders were to act within the framework of general directives as opposed to precise orders, with their
staff officers providing any necessary interpretation and guidance... this approach... provided the necessary flexibility
to deal with different and unexpected situations.
p.3 During his long career, in a pattern he later denied
to other General Staff officers as much as possible, Moltke never commanded a unit, not even a company.
p.103 Modern wars will be carried on with armies of such strength that their
provisioning can be accomplished only by means of railroads. Having control of the railroads is of
the utmost importance.
p.107 During an advance the railroad must first be captured.
This means that the railroad, sure to be destroyed by the enemy, has to be repaired. The country on both sides must
be under control before one can use it. [JLJ - here we see an example of how control is required before one can take
direct action.]
p.114 Telegraphic and written reports by newspaper reporters must especially be subjected to strict
control... Under certain conditions it may be necessary to discontinue all telegraphic communications and even letters
to the homeland in order to protect important secrets for a few days.
p.124 Strategy is a system of expedients; it is more than a mere
scholarly discipline. It is the translation of knowledge to practical life, the improvement of the original leading
thought in accordance with continually changing situations. It is the art of acting under the pressure of the most difficult
conditions.
Strategy is the application of sound human sense to the conduct of war; its teachings
go little beyond the first requirements of common sense. Its value lies entirely in concrete application. The main
point is correctly to estimate at each moment the changing situation and then to do the simplest and most natural things with
firmness and caution. Thus war becomes an art - an art, of course, which is served by many sciences.
In
war, as in art, we find no universal forms; in neither can a rule take the place of talent.
General theories, and
the resulting rules and systems, therefore cannot possibly have practical value in strategy [JLJ - this is no surprise,
consider the quote below from page 125]. Strategy is not constituted like abstract scholarly disciplines. The latter have
their firm and definite truths upon which one can build and from which one can go farther.
p.125 The character of the present-day conduct of war is marked by the attempt to obtain a great
and rapid decision. Calling into service all those capable of bearing arms; the strength of armies; the difficulties
of sustaining them; the enormous cost of being under arms; the disruption of commerce, manufacture, and agriculture; the battle-ready
organization of the armies and the ease with which they are assembled, all press for early termination of the war. [JLJ -
and what general rule or theory would govern warfare fought in this fashion? We can offer none. But this is not the only type
of warfare (it was for Moltke), and in extended conflicts with complex situations and uncertainty, there must be a general
rule or rules which emerge to guide action.]
