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Models of Thought (Simon, 1979)
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The Case for Using Probabilistic Knowledge in a Computer Chess Program (John L. Jerz)
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Nobel Laureate Herbert A. Simon has in the past quarter century been in the front line of the information-processing revolution; in fact, to a remarkable extent his and his colleagues' contributions have written the history of that revolution in cognitive psychology. This book brings together papers dating from the start of Simon's career to the present. Its focus is on modeling the chief components of human cognition and on testing these models experimentally.
 
[JLJ - Herbert Simon explores human thought and uses examples from the game of chess. What concepts can we apply to modern problems, and can we re-apply to our current understanding of games and game theory?]

p.4 The first two chapters describe thinking processes as search processes, another fundamental characteristic of thought... the search is assumed to be a serial, one-thing-at-a-time, exploration.
 
p.13 We see that, by the introduction of a simple payoff function and of a process for gradually improving the mapping of behavior alternatives upon possible outcomes, the process of reaching a rational decision may be drastically simplified from a computational standpoint.
 
p.14 A vague principle would be that as the individual, in his exploration of alternatives, finds it easy to discover satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level rises
 
p.21 Now if an organism is confronted with the problem of behaving approximately rationally, or adaptively, in a particular environment, the kinds of simplifications that are suitable may depend not only on the characteristics - sensory, neural, and other - of the organism, but equally upon the structure of the environment. Hence, we might hope to discover, by a careful examination of some of the fundamental structural characteristics of the environment, some further clues as to the nature of the approximating mechanisms used in decision making.
 
p.25 Suppose that the organism begins to explore, moves to the first need-satisfying point it discovers, resumes its exploration, moves to the next point it discovers that satisfies a need other than the one already satisfied, and so on.
 
p.25-26 A more interesting possibility arises if the food points are not distributed completely at random, and if there are clues that indicate whether a particular intermediate point is rich or poor in paths leading to food points... Once the association between the clue and the subsequent appearance of the food points is learned by the organism, its exploration can terminate with the discovery of the clue... If only certain choice points are provided with such clues, then a combination of random and systematic exploration can be employed. Thus the organism may be led into "regions" where the probability of goal attainment is relatively high, but it may have to explore randomly for food within a given region.
  A concrete example of such behavior in humans is the "position play" characteristic of the first phase of a chess game... Certain positions are adjudged richer in attacking and defensive possibilities than others, but the original choice may involve no definite plan for the subsequent action after the "good" position has been reached.
 
p.26 The central problem of this chapter has been to construct a simple mechanism of choice that would suffice for the behavior of an organism confronted with multiple goals... we are concerned only with finding a choice mechanism that will lead it to pursue a "satisficing" path, a path that will permit satisfaction at some specified level of all of its needs.
 
p.27 The most important conclusion we have reached is that blocks of the organism's time can be allocated to activities related to individual needs (separate means-end chains) without creating any problem of overall allocation or coordination or the need for any general "utility function." The only scarce resource in the situation is time
 
p.27 The principal positive implication of the model is that we should be skeptical in postulating for humans, or other organisms, elaborate mechanisms for choosing among diverse needs.
 
p.28 We have seen that an organism in an environment with these characteristics requires only very simple perceptual and choice mechanisms to satisfy its several needs and to assure a high probability of its survival over extended periods of time. In particular, no "utility function" needs to be postulated for the organism, nor does it require any elaborate procedure for calculating marginal rates of substitution among different wants.
 
p.145 creative thinking is simply a special kind of problem solving behavior. This seems to us a useful working hypothesis.
 
p.146 When we say that these programs [JLJ - a logic proof discovering program and a chess playing program] are simulations of human problem solving... We mean that they solve these problems by using techniques and processes that resemble more or less closely the techniques and processes used by humans.
 
p.152 We use the term heuristic to denote any principle or device that contributes to the reduction in the average search to solution.
 
p.154 Usually the information needed to select promising paths becomes available only as the search proceeds. Examination of paths produces clues of the "warmer-cooler" variety that guide the further conduct of the search.
 
p.162 In this section, we have seen that the success of a problem solver who is confronted with a complex task rests primarily on his ability to select - correctly - a very small part of the total problem solving maze for exploration. The processes that carry out this selection we call heuristics. We have seen that most heuristics depend on a strategy that modifies subsequent search as a function of information obtained in previous search
 
p.167 It sometimes seems to be argued that people would become effective problem solvers if only we could teach them to be unconventional.
 
p.168 to understand the success of effective and creative problem solvers, we must examine not only the motivational and attitudinal factors that enable them to change an initial set or to violate accepted conventions; we must pay equal attention to the richness of their systems of heuristics that makes any particular piece of heuristic dispensable
 
p.178 The exploration tree is precisely analogous to the paths tried by a subject in a maze-running experiment, except that it includes branches for defender's choices as well as branches for the attacker's tries.
 
p.189 the tree can be characterized by counting the number of positions or the number of moves. Simon and Simon (1962) call the total number of positions examined the "exploration tree"... The count of moves seen - the uninvestigated as well as the investigated ones - will be called the discovery tree
 
p.333 The problem solving process is an information gathering process as much as it is a search process. The accumulation of information in the course of the of search permits the search to be selective and gives problem solving in very large spaces a chance of success.

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