p.26 This article presents
the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking. The fundamentals of good strategic thought lie both in recognizing the most significant
interactions between different players, how they influence each other in unexpected ways, and how to measure progress in achieving
the ends of the strategy. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy
choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change. It also offers insight into how to assess
one of the most difficult questions related to strategy in complex environments - how to know when the strategy has been successful.
p.27 All systems thinking models rely on two feedback loops - balancing and reinforcing
loops. A reinforcing loop describes systems where elements reinforce one another, creating either a virtuous or a
vicious cycle... The other key feedback loop is called a “balancing loop.” A balancing loop describes efforts
to solve a problem or close a gap between a desired state and a current state
p.38 Having an understanding of why things happen
is the foundation of a good strategy. Determining ways to measure success in the midst of a... campaign is much more
difficult.
p.40 Another way of organizing measures of progress
is to examine whether they indicate a future change in progress, or serve to document a change that has already taken place.
The former is called a “leading” indicator, while the latter is a “lagging” indicator. Leading
indicators forecast progress. Lagging indicators confirm whether existing strategies are working.
p.40-41 There are, however, two key advantages
to using a leading indicator. These advantages derive from the ability to measure capacity and potential rather than results.
First, the indicator provides an early assessment of results with sufficient time to make changes. A counterinsurgent
might need to modify the goals or add resources depending on this early insight. The counterinsurgent also could use early
measures to calibrate popular expectations for on-going security or governance programs. Second, early indicators
give a policymaker a validation that some kind of progress is being made. Counterinsurgencies do not progress smoothly,
and it is often difficult to sense whether progress is being made... Having measures in hand early on... demonstrates
that the strategy has potential for progress.
p.41 Good... strategists should rely on both leading and lagging indicators
p.41 Strategists should also be concerned about three "snares" they may encounter
in choosing indicators. The first of these snares, as noted above, is that leading indicators will have built-in
assumptions about both progress to date and progress yet to be made... Second, leading indicators tend to
become input or resource based. Inputs to a system are usually easiest to measure, and a correlation is usually assumed
between input and output. Both of these factors contribute to the heavy use of input-based measures that may have only an
indirect bearing on the system as a whole... There is a third concern... one should not judge the success... solely
on the "top 10" indicators and their red, yellow or green status as outlined by some technocrat or think tank.
p.42 This article has introduced an analytic framework for
understanding the dynamics of counterinsurgency, and suggested considerations for how to measure progress.
p.43 In spite of thousands of papers and hundreds
of books of examples of applied systems thinking to other fields of hard and soft science, the author was unable to
find any published examples of systems thinking as applied to insurgency or counterinsurgency strategy. [JLJ - hmmmm...]
