p.122 Nietzsche... argues that moral systems are based on and derive from power relations, from politics.
p.122-123 Relations of power, it appears, are at the foundation of any claim to "identity."
p.213 Nietzsche was, beyond dispute, a somewhat pathetic oddball
p.215 It is not altogether implausible to suggest that Nietzsche's works were neither substitutions
nor projections of himself, but rather a kind of rage against his solitude and suffering
p.231 The formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight arrow, a goal
p.318 According to Foucault... analyses by Nietzsche... demonstrate that there is no secret, atemporal essence
of things lying behind them; their secret is that perhaps they have no essence, or that their essence is constructed piece
by piece, out of forms foreign to them.
p.326 At the Colloquium at Royaumont in 1964, Foucault presented a paper entitled "Nietzsche, Freud,
Marx." In these three thinkers, Foucault detects a profound change in the nature of the sign and the way signs in general
are interpreted. Foucault sees this change breaking ground for the modern epoch, as the representative function
of the sign gives way to a view of the sign as already a part of the activity of interpretation. This is to say,
signs are no longer viewed as the reservoir of some deep, hidden meaning; rather, they are surface
phenomena which confront interpretation with an infinite task:
Interpretation can never be brought to an end, simply because there is nothing to interpret.
There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret because at bottom everything is already interpretation. Each sign
is in itself not the thing that presents itself to interpretation, but the interpretation of other signs.
p.340 Foucault engaged in a highly sophisticated analysis of power which, following Nietzsche's
example, focused not on the subjects of power but on power relations, the relations of force
that operate within social practices and social systems.
p.341 To speak of desire as part of an assemblage... is to recognize that desire and the object
desired arise together... Deleuze rejects the account of desire as lack... Desire does not arise in response to the
perceived lack of the object desired. Desire is part of the infrastructure: it is constitutive of the objects desired
as well as the social field in which they appear. Desire, in other words, again like Nietzsche's will to power, is
productive; it is always at work within the social field, preceding and "producing" objects as desirable.
p.343 if "one is without criteria, yet one must decide," where does the ability to judge come from? ...it
is our task to invent these criteria and make our judgments accordingly.
