p.58 For our purposes we need not be concerned with the many
subtleties and complexities of deterrence theory, but only with the central argument that great dangers arise if an
aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve. This belief will lead the former to test
its opponents, usually starting with a small and apparently unimportant issue. If the status quo powers retreat,
they will not only lose the specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the
aggressor to press harder. Even if the defenders later recognize their plight and are willing to pay a higher price
to prevent further retreats, they will find it increasingly difficult to convince the aggressor of their new-found resolve.
The choice will then be between continuing to retreat and thereby sacrificing basic values or fighting.
To avoid this disastrous situation, the state must
display the ability and willingness to wage war. It may not be able to ignore minor conflicts or to judge disputes
on their merits. Issues of little intrinsic value become highly significant as indices of resolve. [JLJ - this block of text
answers J.C. Wylie's ponderous quest to discover why we need a Navy. The answer, in short, is that it is needed as a deterrence
against aggressive nations that might dangle the threat of war when pressing a demand of another nation... the game of
Chicken is played, if for a brief period, and a Navy is part of that necessary diplomatic game]
p.61 In this view, the world is tightly interconnected. What happens in one interaction influences
other outcomes... In a less extreme version, the other side is seen as without a plan but opportunistically hoping to move
where there is least resistance.
p.63 far-reaching complications are created by the fact that most means of self-protection simultaneously
menace others.
p.68 It is somewhat as if the chessmen were connected by horizontal springs to heavy weights beyond
the chessboard
p.78 Deterrence theory... generally endorses the conventional
view that power must be met by power. The only way to contain aggression and cope with hostility is to build
up and intelligently manipulate sanctions, threats, and force.
p.319 People want to be able to explain as much as possible
of what goes on around them. To admit that a phenomenon cannot be explained, or at least cannot be explained without
adding numerous and complex exceptions to our beliefs, is both psychologically uncomfortable and intellectually unsatisfying.
p.320 But while it is not naive or unreasonable to try to encompass
most of another's behavior under a very few rules, the more complete information available later usually shows that
the behavior was the product of more numerous and complex forces than contemporary observers believed. And, more
important from our standpoint, the predictions that the highly oversimplified model yields are often misleading.
p.320 Secretary of State Dulles believed that "The Russians are great chess players and their
moves in the world situation are... attempted to be calculated as closely and carefully as though they were making moves in
a chess game."
