p.44 accepting a criterion as the criterion... by which the success or otherwise of an action is
to be measured involves not just applying it to one's directed movements, but as it were committing oneself to fulfilling
it, guiding one's self-expression in accordance with its requirements.
p.45 One cannot guide someone else's activity in the same way as one can guide one's own
p.108 [K.J.W. Craik quoted] By a model we thus mean any physical or chemical system
which has a similar relation-structure to that of the process it imitates. By 'relation-structure' I... mean... the fact that
it is a physical working model which works in the same way as the process it parallels in the aspects under consideration
at any moment
p.110 Boden links the notion of 'appropriate' behaviour to that of responses enabling an organism to pursue
its purposes successfully.
p.113 It is of course true that the activities of any system which possesses and exercises conceptual
capacities will require description in 'intensional' terms. None the less it seems to us that 'intensionality'
is a prerequisite of conceptual activity rather than something which can be elucidated by reference to such activity,
and that it is better looked upon as a characteristic of active selves or agents
p.114 Thought must from the very beginning have some tendency to 'point beyond itself' to a 'something'
however vague which is other than itself. Without such [a] pointing, the process of conceptually dividing the world could
not get a toehold from which to begin. You cannot divide up the world in thought unless you have an inkling that there is
a world. Without that inkling (which contains within itself the possibility of error) one's experiences could not lead one
to the belief in a world of objects. Any process of inference from present data presupposes, and could not arrive at, some
apprehension of a reality beyond and outside the immediate thought.
p.115 It would perhaps be better to say that in thinking the thinker points beyond his momentary self, his
self as engaged in thinking that thought. For to talk of thoughts 'pointing beyond' themselves is to make them sound
like momentary agents in their own right. Furthermore, the object of a thought is not thought of as set over against that
thought; it is thought of as set over against the thinker as he now is.
p.115 [chapter title: Intensionality] we are here discussing a fundamental and irreducible feature,
or rather presupposition, of all thought, all conceptual activity and all action, and that our aim is simply to bring
it to people's notice, to try to help them grasp what we are talking about. It can only be noticed or grasped, or not; it
cannot be further described or defined.
p.116 Intensionality is a prior condition of conceptual development.
p.145 Without certain beliefs, intentions would disintegrate, without intentions or action-tendencies wants
would collapse into idle wishes, without the exercise of a conceptual capacity to think of the future intentions and expectations
could not be sustained.
p.154 We have argued that no account of human behaviour, or at any rate of those aspects
of it that are not totally trivial, can hope to succeed which does not rely heavily upon the everyday notions of intention
and of action and upon the network of other notions to which they are inextricably related.
p.178 One assesses and directs the present phase in the light both of previous and of projected
phases, even though one may not distinctly envisage either. And if one could not keep track of the successive phases
and see them, as it were, as parts of a whole manifesting through time, i.e. if one could not relate them temporally and in
other ways, one would lose one's capacity to guide and control the whole action in any coherent fashion.
