xxv Should the work be interrupted by my death, then what is found can only be called a mass of conceptions not brought into form

xxvi The theory of... Strategy... is beset with extraordinary difficulties, and we may affirm that very few men have clear conceptions of the separate subjects... But when it is a question, not of acting oneself, but of convincing others in a consultation, then all depends on clear conceptions and demonstration of the inherent relations, and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really without any value.

p.36 There is only one single means, it is the Fight... whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting... all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat.

p.37 the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every application of armed power... Every activity in War, therefore, necessarily relates to the combat either directly or indirectly... The soldier is levied, clothed, armed, exercised, he sleeps, eats, drinks, and marches, all merely to fight at the right time and place.

  If, therefore, all the threads of military activity terminate in the combat, we shall grasp them all when we settle the order of the combats. Only from this order and its execution proceed the effects, never directly from the conditions preceding them. Now, in the combat all the action is directed to the destruction of the enemy, or rather of his fighting powers, for this lies in the conception of combat. The destruction of the enemy's fighting power is, therefore, always the means to attain the object of the combat.

p.75 Great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give. The law of probability must be his guide.

p.85 The Art of War is therefore, in its proper sense, the art of making use of the given means in fighting

p.86 Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of War.

p.88-89 Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. The act of marching in the combat, generally called manoeuvring, certainly does not necessarily include the use of weapons, but it is so completely and necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral part of that which we call a combat. But the march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when, where, and with what forces a battle is to be delivered - and to carry that into execution the march is the only means.

p.91 We remind our readers that strategy may follow a great diversity of objects, for everything which appears an advantage may be the object of a combat

p.105-106 Lastly, the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently - like the effect of a fog or moonshine - gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance.

What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must discover, or must be left to chance. It is therefore again talent, or the favour of fortune, on which reliance must be placed, for want of objective knowledge.

p.165 Strategy forms the plan of the War, and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision... it makes the plans for the separate campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each.

p.168 Thus, then, in Strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy.

p.168 we do not see things in Strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics, with the living eye, but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the convictions produced are less powerful.

p.172-173 Possible Combats Are On Account Of Their Results To Be Looked Upon As Real Ones... In both cases, therefore, the mere possibility of a battle has produced results, and is therefore to be classed amongst actual events... the battle which we offered at (either of) those points has not on that account been without effect, for it attracted the enemy's forces to that point... In this manner we see that the destruction of the enemy's military forces, the overthrow of the enemy's power, is only to be done through the effect of a battle, whether it be that it actually takes place, or that it is merely offered, and not accepted.

p.174-175 If we do not accustom ourselves to look upon War, and the single campaigns in War, as a chain which is all composed of battles strung together, one of which always brings on another; if we adopt the idea that the taking of a certain geographical point, the occupation of an undefended province, is in itself anything; then we are very likely to regard it as an acquisition which we may retain; and if we look at it so, and not as a term in the whole series of events, we do not ask ourselves whether this possession may not lead to greater disadvantages hereafter. How often we find this mistake recurring in military history.