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Strategic Interaction (Goffman, 1969)
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The two essays in this book deal with the calculative, gamelike aspects of interaction. Erving Goffman examines the strategy of words and deeds; he uses the term "Strategic interaction" to describe those gamelike events in which each player's situation is fully dependent on the move of his opponent and in which each player knows this and has the wit to use his awareness. Mr. Goffman aims to show that strategic interaction can be isolated analytically from the general study of communication and face-to-face interaction.
  Expression games, in which each man spars to discover the value of information openly or unwittingly given by the other, are always only a part of strategic interaction. The author uses vivid examples from espionage literature and high-level political maneuvers to show how men mislead each other in the information game. Both observer and observed create evidence that is false and uncover evidence that is real.
  In strategic interaction, the player's move is the central concern, and expressions games are secondary, for Mr. Goffman makes clear that often, when it seems that a man's word sets off the action, he really has a finger on the trigger, your chips on the table, or your check in his bank. Communication may reinforce conduct, but it is not the same thing.
  Those who gamble with their wits, and those who study those who do, will find this analysis an important book.

p.29-30 If a subject does not know about the kinds of cues in his own situation a sophisticated observer can use as a source of information, then the subject can hardly obfuscate them (or accentuate them), were he desirous of doing so.
 
p.47 As G.H. Mead has argued, when an individual considers taking a course of action, he is likely to hold off until he has imagined in his mind the consequence of his action for others involved, their likely response to this consequence, and the bearing of this response on his own designs. He then modifies his action so that it now incorporates that which he calculates will usefully modify the other's generated response. In effect, he adapts to the other's response before it has been called forth, and adapts in such a way that it never does have to be made. Has has thus incorporated tacit moves into his line of behavior.
 
p.95 A second matter that Harry will want to know about is what has been called operational code, namely, the orientation to gaming that will diffusely influence how the opponent plays... There is the opponent's preference pattern or utility function, namely, his ordering, weak or strong, of aims and goals.
 
p.100-101 Now it is possible to review the defining conditions for strategic interaction. Two or more parties must find themselves in a well-structured situation of mutual impingement where each party must make a move and where every possible move carries fateful implications for all of the parties. In this situation, each player must influence his own decision by his knowing that the other players are likely to try to dope out his decision in advance, and may even appreciate that he knows this is likely. Courses of action or moves will then be made in light of one's thoughts about the others' thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves made on the basis of this kind of orientation to self and others can be called strategic interaction.
 
p.102 Once nature, self-interest, and an intelligent opponent are assumed, nothing else need be; strategic interaction follows. And, in fact, some of the developments in game theory require no more than these minimal assumptions, the object being to find a desirable strategy for Harry in the face of opponents as intelligent and amoral as himself.
 
p.114 One can begin by noting that Harry's situation... can be seen in terms of the constraints, restrictions, and controls that dominate his activity. These must be analytically differentiated.
 
p.137 strategic interaction addresses itself directly to the dynamics of interdependence involving mutual awareness; it seeks out basic moves and inquires into natural stopping points in the potentially infinite cycle of two players taking into consideration their consideration of each other's consideration, and so forth.

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